



ZETES TSP ROOT CA

CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT AND CERTIFICATE POLICY

*Certification Practice Statement
for the
ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA*

Publication date :	24/02/2020		
Effective date :	24/02/2020		
CPS OID :	1.3.6.1.4.1.47718.2.1.1.1		
CP OID :	1.3.6.1.4.1.47718.2.1.2.1		
Version :	1.2	14/02/2020	Approved by PMA

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ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

Scope

The present document is the Certificate Policy (CP) and Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the ZETES TSP Root CA.

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Document Version History

Version	Publication Date	Effective Date	Information about this Version
1.2	24/02/2020	24/02/2020	Annual review. Updated “About Zetes” , now mentions Panasonic. The reference to end-entities receiving certificates from subordinated issuing CA’s now also include legal persons a.o. to allow for eIDAS electronic seals. Updated references to legislation and norms. Updated the CA-hierarchy schematic in chapter 7.1 and removed the redundant and obsolete schematic in chapter 1.3.1. Clarified FIPS 186-3/4 compliance.
1.1	08/02/2019	11/02/2019	Reviewed. Correction of typos and redundant white space. Updated corporate information (Panasonic, ZetesConfidens). Integration of Certificate Policy OID.
1.2	27/06/2016	29/06/2016	first publication -----

ABOUT ZETES

Founded in 1984, Zetes NV/SA is a company incorporated in Belgium (European Union) and is part of the Zetes Group, which is fully owned by the Panasonic Group. Zetes NV/SA is active in the areas of identification documents, travel documents, smartcards, biometrics and trust services including the issuance of certificates.

In 2016, Zetes established an operational business unit within Zetes NV/SA to provide certificate services and other trust services for governments, the financial sector and private organizations. Since September 2018 these activities are marketed under the **ZetesConfidens** tradename (before referred to as “Zetes TSP”).

All further references to “Zetes” in this document refer to the legal entity Zetes NV/SA unless explicitly stated otherwise.

Zetes NV/SA is registered in Belgium as follows:

Dutch language	French language	English language
Zetes NV	Zetes SA	Zetes SA
Straatsburgstraat 3 1130 Brussel België BTW BE 0408 425 626	Rue de Strasbourg 3 1130 Bruxelles Belgique TVA BE 0408 425 626	Rue de Strasbourg 3 1130 Brussels Belgium VAT BE 0408 425 626

Under Belgian law, NV (*Dutch* Naamloze Vennootschap) and SA (*French* Société Anonyme) are equivalent terms.

ZETESCONFIDENS operates its own trust infrastructure and acts as a Trusted Service Provider (TSP) as defined in the Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market.

ZETESCONFIDENS is supervised by the FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-employed and Energy - Quality and Safety, the Belgian Supervisory Body and is audited and listed in the Belgian and European Trusted List of Qualified TSP.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

ZETESCONFIDENS operates a 2-level CA hierarchy.

This document applies to the issuance of subordinate CA certificates under the ZETES TSP ROOT CA root. The ZETES TSP ROOT CA only issues certificates to subordinate CAs that are part of the ZETESCONFIDENS PKI environment.

The provision and use of subordinate CA certificates issued by ZETES TSP ROOT CA are governed by the present Certification Practice Statement (CPS) and Certificate Policy (CP).

The provision and use of the certificates for end-entities, issued by ZETESCONFIDENS subordinate CA, are governed by the related Certification Practice Statement (CPS) and the Certificate Policy of each subordinate CA and are out of scope of the present document. By default, information related to ZETESCONFIDENS subordinate CAs and/or end-entities certificates is thus provided in the related documentation. The present document may specify information related to subordinate CAs certificates when needed for the sake of clarity or of conformity to the RFC 3647 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework.

Conformity with RFC 3647

This document conforms to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 3647 framework and template for Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement construction. It contains information pertaining to the CA practices, including amongst other, the PKI (CA and related components) certificate profiles, applicability and management lifecycles.

Non-disclosure

Section 3.6 of the RFC 3647 and clause 5.2 of the ETSI EN 319 411-1 provide for the use of references to divide disclosures between public information and security sensitive confidential information. For reasons of confidentiality, ZETES cannot disclose all details on controls in this document but may instead include references to internal detailed documents. These documents will only be made available to duly authorised auditors.

1.2 Document name and identification

This document is called the 'ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA – Certification Practice Statement'.

The OID for the Certification Practice Statement is:

dotted notation	1.3.6.1.4.1.47718.2.1.1.1
full notation	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1) zetes(47718) zetes-tsp(2) cs(1) cert practice-statement(1) rootca(1) }

The OID for the Certificate Policy is:

dotted notation	1.3.6.1.4.1.47718.2.1.2.1
full notation	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1) zetes(47718) zetes-tsp(2) cs(1) cert policy (2) rootca(1) }

1.3 PKI participants

In the context of issuing CA Certificates, ZETESCONFIDENS is acting as the Certification Service Provider (CSP). ZETESCONFIDENS operates a 2-level CA hierarchy. The top level is made of the ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA that issues certificates to subordinate CAs.

ZETESCONFIDENS has final and overall responsibility for the provision of the ZETESCONFIDENS CA certificates offering, namely:

- the provision service equipment, infrastructure and personnel for the subordinate CA,
- supervision and operation of equipment, infrastructure and personnel for the subordinate CA,
- the certificate generation services, through the ZETESCONFIDENS Root Certification Authority,
- the Registration Management Services, through the ZETESCONFIDENS trusted persons in charge of the management of the PKI and under the responsibility of the ZETESCONFIDENS Policy Management (PMA),
- the Suspension and Revocation Management Services, through the ZETESCONFIDENS trusted persons in charge of the management of the PKI and under the responsibility of the ZETESCONFIDENS Policy Management (PMA),
- the Revocation Status Information Service (providing Certificate validity status information),
- the Dissemination Services.

ZETESCONFIDENS is only one of several PKI participants. The PKI participants are all the legal entities who are involved in any of the processes and activities of ZETESCONFIDENS as a Certification Service Provider (CSP) and/or who are impacted using certificates issued by ZETESCONFIDENS acting as a CSP. All participants adhere to or are bound by the Certification Practice Statements and Certificate Policies that are maintained by ZETESCONFIDENS.

The PKI participants, concerned by the whole CA hierarchy, are defined as follows:

Subscribers	<p>For the top level of the CA hierarchy concerned by the present document, the Subscriber is ZETESCONFIDENS, owner and operator of a subordinate CA.</p> <p>For the second level of the CA hierarchy, the Subscriber is an organization or can be the end-entity</p>
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	that enters into a contractual agreement with ZETESCONFIDENS on behalf of Subject(s).
Subjects	<p>For the top level of the CA hierarchy concerned by the present CPS, subjects are ZETESCONFIDENS Certification Authorities (i.e. a subordinate CA).</p> <p>For the second level of the CA hierarchy, subjects are natural persons or legal persons whose identity or identifier is encoded in the end user certificate issued by a CA. A Subject adheres to a Subscriber.</p>
Relying Parties	Third parties who rely on the validity of the certificate issued by the CA hierarchy.
CA - Certification Authorities	Certification Authority which issues certificates to Subjects (on request of the RA for the second level of the hierarchy, and on request of the PMA for subjects that are CAs).
Publication and Repository Services	Online publication of documents such as Certification Practice Statements, Certificate Policies, Certificates Terms and Conditions, certificate validation data such as root certificates, certificate revocation lists, etc.

The PKI participants specifically concerned by the second level of the CA hierarchy (which is out of scope of the present document) are defined as follows:

RA - Registration Authority	The entity representing the overall organisation of registration authority bodies. The RA as supervising authority over the C-RA, SUB-RA and L-RA, authenticates registration/certificate requests from the SUB-RA.
C-RA - Central Registration Authorities	The central infrastructure hosted by ZETESCONFIDENS. It handles the registration and vetting of certificate requests received from the SUB-RAs. The C-RA coordinates the certificate creation process between the key generation process on the Subject's signature creation device (either a smartcard or a managed HSM) and the CA. It is the only part of the RA that is in direct contact with the CA or with the Subject key generation infrastructure.
SUB-RA - Subordinate Registration Authorities	The authority for the registration and vetting of Subjects and certificate requests for a specific Subscriber or group of Subscribers. The SUB-RA is usually associated with or part of the Subscriber.
L-RA - Local Registration Authorities	A local representative of the SUB-RA. The L-RA performs the front-office registration tasks and first-line vetting of Subjects.
SRA - Suspension and Revocation Authority	The entity representing the overall organisation of suspension and revocation authority bodies. Has supervising authority over the C-SRA, SUB-SRAs and L-SRAs, authenticates suspend/revocation requests from the SUB-SRAs.

C-SRA - Central Suspension and Revocation Authority	The central infrastructure at ZETESCONFIDENS for processing suspension and revocation requests, dissemination of certificate status information. It is the only part of the SRA that is in direct contact with the CA.
SUB-SRA - Subordinate Suspension and Revocation Authority	The authority for the registration or initiation of suspension and revocation requests for a specific Subscriber or group of Subscribers. The SUB-SRA is usually associated with or part of the Subscriber.
L-SRA - Suspension and Revocation Authority	A local representative of the SUB-SRA, who performs the front-office request procedure and vetting procedure for a Subject requesting suspension or revocation of the Subject's certificate.
Subject Device Provisioning Services more commonly referred to as Card Provisioning Services	The Subject Device is also referred to as "card" or as "SSCD" for Secure Signature/Seal Creation Device or "QSCD" for Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device. ZETESCONFIDENS supplies the device to the Subscribers and Subjects. The device is usually a PKI smartcard but can also be another form factor such as a USB PKI device.
Subject Device Personalisation and Delivery Services more commonly referred to as Card Personalisation and Delivery Services	Card personalisation services by Zetes CardS, i.e. the process of printing the card body, encoding the chip and generating the cryptographic keys on the chip, printing the PIN/PUK letter, etc. Card Delivery Services i.e. the process of distributing the cards and PIN/PUK letters to the Subjects and/or card issuing points.

Within the context of this CPS, ZETESCONFIDENS fulfils all the following roles:

- Certificate Authority, as owner and operator of the root CA
- Subscriber, as owner and operator of the subordinate CA
- Subject, i.e. the subordinate CA
- Publication and Repository Services

ZETESCONFIDENS being both CSP and Subscriber, there are no separate bodies for Registration Authority nor for Suspension and Revocation Authority as such. Rather, there are a series of procedure put in place for the issuance of PKI component certificates such as the Root CA self-signed certificate, subordinate CA certificates and certificates for certificate status validation services such as OCSP responder certificates. These procedures are undertaken by ZETESCONFIDENS persons in trusted roles, under multiple control and under the responsibility of the PMA such as further described in the present CPS and its related confidential and internal documentation.

1.3.1 Certification Authorities (CA)

CAs are responsible for:

- Issuing certificates;
- Issuing CRLs (Certificate Revocation List) on a regular basis or when a certificate status change occurs;
- Providing OCSP (On-line Certificate Status Protocol) services

ZETESCONFIDENS operates a CA hierarchy with subordinate CAs with dedicated certificate issuing policies including ETSI policies Lightweight / Normalized / Qualified for certificates for natural persons or legal persons as well as policies for issuing timestamp certificates.

ZETESCONFIDENS reserves the right to add additional subordinate CA hierarchies under the ZETES TSP Root CA in the future. These subordinate CA hierarchies operate under the authority of ZETESCONFIDENS and must adhere to the terms and conditions of the CPS for the Zetes TSP Root CA. Each CA in a subordinate CA hierarchy under the ZETES TSP Root CA has a dedicated CPS, adapted to the specific purpose of the certificate issued by that CA hierarchy.

1.3.2 Registration and Revocation Authorities ((S)RA)

Within the context of the Zetes TSP Root CA all entities involved in the registration of a subject/subscriber are part of Zetes TSP. There is no RA body as such, but well an organisational structure and the infrastructure within ZETESCONFIDENS to perform as an RA and that is tasked with the following duties:

- process subordinate CAs' certificate requests
- authenticate and validate the Subordinate CA and the certificate request itself
- act upon the result of this validation and, if approved, on the Zetes TSP Root CA infrastructure
 - select the appropriate Certificate Profile
 - submit a certificate request to the appropriate Root CA
 - retrieve the certificate from the CA

For these duties, the RA acts under direct authority and supervision of the Zetes TSP Policy Management Authority (see section 1.3.6).

1.3.3 Subscribers and Subjects

Zetes TSP as operator of a Subordinate CA is the Subscriber.

The Subject is the PKI Component entity that is certified by the Zetes TSP Root CA; the Subjects are either a subordinate CA of Zetes TSP or a certificate status validation service of Zetes TSP, such as an OCSP responder.

1.3.4 Relying parties

The Relying Parties are those parties who are relying on a certificate that is issued by a CA belonging to a CA hierarchy of the Zetes TSP PKI.

1.3.5 Other participants

1.3.5.1 Dissemination and Repository Services

ZETES is operating the Dissemination Services (publication of Certification Practice Statement, Certificate Policy, Certificates Terms and Conditions, CA certificates, certificate revocation lists and other related, public documents).

This service also provides access to previous versions of these documents (Certification Practice Statement, Certificate Policy, Certificates Terms and Conditions).

Access to CRLs, CA Certificates and OCSP certificate status validation services is made available to all Relying Parties without restrictions.

The Dissemination and Repository Services are provided as described in section 2 of the present Certification Practice Statement.

1.3.5.2 Revocation Management Services and Revocation Status Information Services

ZETES is responsible for operating the Revocation Management Services and the Revocation Status Information Services (which provide Certificate validity status information).

1.3.6 Policy Management Authority (PMA)

The PMA has overall responsibility for the TSP Services.

The PMA is the high-level management body with final authority and responsibility for:

- (a) Specifying and approving the PKI infrastructure and practices.
- (b) Approving the Certification Practice Statement and the related certificate policies, as well as other declarations of practices and policies for other TSP services when applicable (e.g. time stamping Practice Statement and policies).
- (c) Defining the review process for, including responsibilities for maintaining, the Certification Practice Statement and the related certificate policies, as well as other declarations of practices and policies for other PKI services when applicable (e.g. time stamping Practice Statement and policies).
- (d) Defining the review process that ensures that applicable certificate policies, and other relevant policies when applicable, are supported by the Practice Statement(s).
- (e) Defining the review process that ensures that the PKI authorities, including certification authorities (CAs) and other authorities when applicable (e.g. time stamping authorities – TSAs), as well as all component service of the PKI, properly implements the applicable practices, policies and procedures.
- (f) When applicable, authorising part or all component service of the PKI to be provided and/or operated by third parties and the applicable terms and conditions.
- (g) Publication to the Subscribers and Relying Parties of the relevant declaration of practices and of policies.
- (h) Continually and effectively managing PKI related risks. This includes a responsibility to periodically re-evaluate risks to ensure that the controls that have been defined remain appropriate, and a responsibility to periodically review the controls as implemented, to ensure that they continue to be effective.
- (i) Specifying cross-certification or mutual recognition procedures and handling related requests.
- (j) Defining internal and external auditing processes with the aim to ensure the proper implementation of the applicable practices, policies and procedures.
- (k) Initiating and supervising internal and external audits.
- (l) Executing the audit recommendations.
- (m) Undertaking any action it considers necessary to ensure the proper execution of the above areas of responsibility.
- (n) Defining the scope of the PKI related service offering, among others by:
 - 1) Defining the certificate classes to be supported by the PKI;
 - 2) Defining the PKI related entities that will be registered by or under the responsibility of the RA.
 - 3) Defining the needs for policies that are to be followed for each of the certificate classes;
- (o) Ensuring that practices for each of the above mentioned entities are defined and implemented in a manner that is consistent with this document;
- (p) Mediating in disputes involving Subscribers and/or entities that have been registered by the RA and the entities that have been implemented by or under the responsibility of the CSP.
- (q) Initiating when appropriate highly sensitive PKI operations such as CA root key revocation and renewal or termination of the PKI service.

1.4 Certificate usage

1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses

The appropriate certificate usage is described in the present CPS for all PKI components certificates.

The CA uses private signing keys and the related certificates only for signing subscriber's certificates, C(A)RLs and PKI services certificates (e.g. sub-CA's, OCSP server) in accordance with the intended use of each of these keys. Other usages are restricted.

It is the responsibility of the Subject to use the certificates accordingly. It is the Subject's or the Subscriber's responsibility to use software applications that correctly interprets, displays and uses the information and restrictions encoded in the certificates, such as but not limited to key usage, limited liability per transaction, etc.

It is the responsibility of the Subscriber, the Subject and the Relying Party to decide for which purpose the certificates are considered trustworthy. A Relying Party must always take into account the level of assurance and other information in the present CPS, the QCA CPS and related CP, before deciding on the applicability of the certificate.

1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses

Any usage of a certificate, other than the usage explicitly allowed in the CPS and the CP, is prohibited.

Root CA

The use of the Root-CA certificate to sign end-entities certificates is prohibited, to the exception of internal certificates used to secure the PKI.

Subordinate CAs

Subordinate CA of Zetes TSP CAs cannot issue CA's certificates.

1.5 Policy administration

1.5.1 Organization administering the document

The present document is administered by the ZETESCONFIDENS Policy Management Authority (PMA).

The PMA includes senior members of management as well as staff responsible for the operational management of the ZETESCONFIDENS PKI environment.

1.5.2 Contact person

All questions and comments regarding the present document should be addressed to the representative of the Policy Management Authority (PMA):

Contact address:	pma@tsp.zetes.com	
Postal address:	Straatsburgstraat 3	3, rue de Strasbourg
	1130 HAREN	1130 HAEREN
	BELGIË	BELGIQUE
Telephone nr:	0032 2 728 37 11	
Web site:	http://tsp.zetes.com	

1.5.3 Person determining suitability for the policy

The PMA determines the present document's suitability for the ZETESCONFIDENS certification services.

1.5.4 Document approval procedures

The PMA is responsible for the approval of the CPS. The existing ZETES Change Control mechanism will be used to trace all identified changes to the content of this Certification Practice Statement.

This Certification Practice Statement shall be reviewed in its entirety every year or when major changes are implemented.

Errors, updates, or suggested changes to this Certification Practice Statement shall be communicated to the Policy Management Authority.

1.6 Definitions and acronyms

1.6.1 Acronyms

ARL	Authority Revocation List
CA	Certificate Authority
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSP	Certification Service Provider
DN	Distinguished Name
HSM	Hardware Security Module
LRA	Local Registration Authority
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PMA	Policy Management Authority
RA	Registration Authority

1.6.2 Definitions

Activation Data	Data values other than whole private keys that are required to operate private keys or cryptographic modules containing private keys, such as a PIN, passphrase, or portions of a private key used in a key-splitting scheme. Protection of activation data prevents unauthorised use of the private key.
Certificate	A unit of information contained in a file that is digitally signed by the Certification Authority. It contains, at a minimum, the issuer, a public key, and a set of information that identifies the entity that holds the private key corresponding to the public key.
Certificate Revocation List	A signed list of identifiers of Certificates that have been revoked. Abbreviated as CRL. It is made available by the CA to Subscribers and Relying Parties. The CRL is updated after each Certificate revocation process. The CRL does not necessarily contain identifiers of revoked Certificates that are past their validity date (that is, expired).
Hardware Security Module	Hardware Security Module. An electronic device offering secure key pair generation and storage, and implementing cryptographic operations using the stored key pairs.
Lightweight Certificate	A Certificate, issued under the policy and security requirements for TSPs issuing certificates as defined in ETSI EN 319 411 – Part 1, under the Lightweight certificate policy [LCP] offering a quality of service less onerous than the NCP (requiring less demanding policy requirements) for use where a risk assessment does not justify the additional burden of meeting all requirements of the NCP (e.g. physical presence), for certificates used in support of any type of transaction (such as digital signatures, web authentication).
Normalized Certificate	A Certificate, issued under the policy and security requirements for TSPs issuing certificates as defined in ETSI EN 319 411 – Part 1, whereby the certification authority may support the same level of quality as for issuing Qualified Certificates, but "normalized" for wider applicability and for ease of alignment. The standard is applicable to the general requirements of certification in support of cryptographic mechanisms, including the general use of cryptography for authentication and encryption.

Qualified Certificate	<p>A Certificate which meets the requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Annex I thereof, and is provided by a Qualified Trust Service Provider who fulfils the requirements laid down in the Regulation.</p> <p>The Regulation distinguishes between Qualified Certificates for different purposes: electronic signature, electronic seals, or website authentication.</p>
Relying party	<p>Person or organisation acting upon a Certificate, typically to verify signatures by the Subscriber or to perform encryption towards the Subscriber. The Relying Party relies upon the accuracy of the binding between the Subscriber public key distributed via that Certificate and the identity and/or other attributes of the Subscriber contained in that Certificate.</p> <p>In the context of this <i>Certification Practice Statement</i>, Relying Parties are as further defined in section 1.3.4.</p>
Subscriber	<p>Person or organisation contracting with the Certification Authority, for being issued one or more Certificates.</p> <p>In the context of this <i>Certification Practice Statement</i>, the Subscribers are as further defined in section 1.3.</p>

2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 Repositories

ZETESCONFIDENS operates services 24/7 for the publication of information for Subscribers, Subjects and Relying Parties.

The CA certificates and certificate status information is made available in formats and through protocols that support automated certificate validation by standard-compliant software applications.

The same information is also available for manual download from the ZETESCONFIDENS web sites. Supporting information such as the various (versions of) Certification Practice Statement documents, Certificate Policy documents, etc. are also available for download from the same web site.

The complete overview of online repositories and services is as follows:

https://confidens.zetes.com	Commercial presentation of ZETESCONFIDENS
http://tsp.zetes.com https://tsp.zetes.com	This URL refers to the welcome page of the web site for ZETESCONFIDENS. This web site provides: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • general information about Zetes SA and the ZETESCONFIDENS business unit • announcements and notifications • a section with technical support and documentation and software downloads for users of the cards and/or certificates that are issued by ZETESCONFIDENS • a section with user friendly web pages for downloading documents such as the terms and conditions, certificate policies, etc. • a section with user friendly web pages for downloading CA certificates and certificate revocation lists (the URLs for these download pages are listed further down in this table) • a contact page
https://repository.tsp.zetes.com	This URL refers directly to the page for downloading documents such as the <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Certificate Terms and Conditions, • Certification Practice Statements, • Certificate Policies, • etc.
http://crt.tsp.zetes.com	This URL refers to <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a web page for manual interactive download of CA certificates 2. a server for automated direct download of CA certificates (the direct download link is encoded in the certificates)
http://crl.tsp.zetes.com	This URL refers to <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a web page for manual interactive download of ARL and CRL 2. a server for automated direct download of ARL and CRL (the direct download link is encoded in the certificates)
http://ocsp.tsp.zetes.com	This URL refers to the OCSP service for immediate online certificate status checks. The OCSP service is synchronised with the latest CRL to provide answers and checks the expiration before the revocation.

2.2 Publication of certification information

Availability

Availability of the document repository and the combined CRL repository is designed to exceed 99.0% of business hours - defined as 24 hours per day, seven days per week, excluding planned maintenance periods.

Planned maintenance periods will be announced on <http://tsp.zetes.com> at least 24 hours in advance.

In case of unavailability due to an act of God, failure of infrastructure outside the control of ZETESCONFIDENS or any other reason, Zetes SA shall make best endeavours to reinstate availability of the service within 5 working days.

Publication of CA certificates in a repository

ZETESCONFIDENS, as a matter of policy, publishes its CA certificates in a public certificate repository:

<http://crt.tsp.zetes.com>

These certificates can be downloaded manually by or automatically by software applications. The fingerprint information for these certificates are stated in the Certification Practice Statement document for the CA.

The fingerprint information for the Zetes TSP Root CA is printed in section 7.1 of this document.

Relying parties who wish to validate these values before installing the CA certificates, can obtain out-of-band confirmation within 3 working days via

info@tsp.zetes.com

Certificate Status Information

Certificate status information for CA certificates issued by the Root CA is made available in two formats:

- as downloadable CRLs
- as OCSP service

CRLs are published at regular intervals on the CRL distribution point

<http://crl.tsp.zetes.com>.

The CRLs are renewed when certificates have been revoked or when the CRL is about to expire. Expired certificates that were revoked before their expiration dates are removed from the certificate revocation lists. CRLs are updated until all certificates that that were issued by the respective CA key have expired.

Expired certificates that were revoked before their expiration dates are removed from the certificate revocation lists.

The OCSP service is synchronised with the latest CRL. More information is available in section 4.10.

2.3 Time or frequency of publication

Publication of CA certificates in a repository

New CA Certificates are published in the repository before end-entity certificates emanating from these CAs are made available to the Subjects.

Certificate Status Information

The CRL is created either every 12 months or when a CA certificate is revoked.

CRLs are published in the repository immediately following creation, and will be available for download within 3 hours after creation.

The OCSP service is immediately synchronised with the latest CRL when that CRL is published.

Publication of terms and conditions, CSP, etc.

Updates to the Certificate Policy, Certification Practice Statement, Certificates Terms and Conditions, and other public documents are published whenever a change occurs, ensuring a period of minimum four (4) days between the publication date and the effective date (see section 9.12).

2.4 Access controls on repositories

Only authorized staff and internal systems of ZETESCONFIDENS have access rights to update, delete or create new resources in these repositories.

Subscribers, Subjects and Relying Parties have read-only access via the internet to all the repositories mentioned in section 2.1.

Under normal conditions, all external parties have access to the repositories and to the OCSP service, free of charge.

ZETESCONFIDENS will take reasonable measures to protect and prevent against abuse of the repositories and the OCSP service and will strive to give all parties equal and unhindered access.

ZETESCONFIDENS reserves the right to refuse access, to limit access or to charge a fee for parties who make excessive use of these resources and are thereby obstructing other Relying Parties

ZETESCONFIDENS reserves the right to refuse access, to limit access or to charge a fee for parties who use these resources for the purpose of commercializing value-add services to third parties.

3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Types of names

All CA certificates only contain names that represent legal entities. Names associated with natural persons are not allowed.

The DN for the ZETES TSP ROOT CA is:

```
CN= ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001
SN= 001
O= ZETES SA (VATBE-0408425626)
C= BE
```

In the above 001 is the 3-digit serial number assigned by the RA to as part of the name of the CA entity. This serial number should not to be confused with the certificate serial number which is automatically generated.

3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The names used in the certificates are chosen such that:

- it is clear that the certificate is a CA certificate,
- it is clear what the purpose of the CA is,
- it includes an unambiguous identification of the legal entity of the Subscriber.

The names CA certificates issued for the Zetes TSP are issued will include the following name information:

```
O= ZETES SA (VATBE-0408425626)
C= BE
```

Many software applications use the commonName field to show a choice of certificates to the end user. To help the end user choose the appropriate certificate, the commonName field may also contain plain wording describing the intended usage of the certificate (i.e. "Qualified CA").

serialNumber	a unique identifier
commonName	meaningful name of the subordinate CA
organizationName	official registered name of the Subscribing CA as a corporation or organization, including an official registered unique number or unique identifier of the Subscriber as a corporation or organization As formatted in ETSI EN 319 412-1 (e.g. VATBE-0123456789) together with a semantic identifier. It is representing the registration number of the organization as stated in the official records.

3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of Subscribers

Not applicable.

3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms

No stipulations.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of names

The DN are guaranteed to be unique across the ZETESCONFIDENS PKI Domain.

3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

No stipulations.

3.2 Initial identity validation

3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key

The certificate request is an industry standard format that contains the public key for the new certificate and is signed with the corresponding private key. The key generation process for the request and the creation of the request itself is performed by employees of Zetes TSP in trusted role. The request is transferred to the Root CA on a secure medium to prevent unauthorized access and protect the request from manipulation or replacement. As a general rule, the creation of the certificate request and the issuance on the certificate is performed on the same day, by the same Zetes TSP employees and in the same location.

The PMA provides a written authorisation to re-instated the Root CA for this sole purpose.

The methods to prove the possession of private key for CAs, are detailed in internal confidential documentation.

Methods to prove the possession of private key for PKI component services (e.g. OCSP responders) are detailed in internal confidential documentation.

3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity

The ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA only issues certificates for subordinate CAs or for itself (as self-signed certificate or for its own certificate status validation services (CRL signing and OCSP responders)). For both cases, the organization identity is Zetes TSP or other organisation entities that are part of the same legal entity Zetes SA. Identification and authentication procedures for the registration of the PKI component services (e.g. CAs, OCSP responders, etc.) are detailed in internal confidential documentation.

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

The ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA only issues certificates for PKI components. The ZETESCONFIDENS Qualified CA does not issue certificates to individuals. Authentication of an individual as the Subject of the certificate is therefore not applicable.

Identification and authentication procedures for the registration of the trusted persons/roles operating the PKI component services are detailed in internal confidential documentation.

3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber information

Not applicable.

3.2.5 Validation of authority

Not applicable.

3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation

Not applicable.

3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests

Not applicable. Certificate re-keying is not allowed.

3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request

The following participants may request revocation of a Subject certificate:

- ZETESCONFIDENS as operator of the Zetes TSP Root CA
- the Subscriber, i.e. ZETESCONFIDENS as operator of the Subordinate CA

Each revocation request must be approved by the Policy Management Authority (section 1.3.6).

The procedures and conditions may be more explicitly defined per Subordinate CA in internal confidential documents.

See section 4.9 for more information about the procedures for revocation of a PKI component certificate.

4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The procedures relating to PKI component services (e.g. CAs, OCSP responders, etc.) and the related persons/roles operating them are described in this CPS and in internal confidential documentation. The following sections only present the elements of these documents that can be publicly disclosed.

Within the context of the Zetes TSP Root CA, only employees of ZETESCONFIDENS who are assigned to the CA entities are authorized to perform certificate lifecycle operations. ZETESCONFIDENS is responsible for these employees and assures that each person, for the assigned duties:

- is screened for appropriate security clearance,
- receives the required training and information,
- is properly informed about the obligations and responsibilities
- is given proper authorization from the PKI Policy Management Authority.

All certificate lifecycle operations described in this chapter are performed under control and witnessing of several trusted employees. Transfer to and from the offline Root CA system is done using a dedicated secure storage medium which protects the data against manipulation.

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application

The ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA does not issue certificates to natural persons, to organisations or to individuals representing an organisation. Certification requests can only originate from ZETESCONFIDENS as operator of a Subordinate CA and must be for a PKI component such as for a subordinate CA of Zetes TSP or for the certificate validations services of ZETESCONFIDENS.

Each certification request must be approved by the PKI Policy Management Authority (section 1.3.6).

The procedures and conditions may be more explicitly defined per Subordinate CA in internal confidential documents.

4.1.2 Enrolment process and responsibilities

The enrolment process for a CA's certificate request

Since the Subscriber is ZETESCONFIDENS and the Subject is a PKI component of ZETESCONFIDENS, the enrolment process is a purely internal procedure. The identification and authentication of the Subscriber is implicit.

The enrolment process:

- is handled by various entities that are collectively referred to as the Registration Authority or RA under the responsibility of ZETESCONFIDENS. For a description of these entities and their respective roles, please see 1.3.2.
- consists of internal processes such as the definition of the purpose and content of the certificate, the key ceremony for the creation of the key pair, configuration of internal applications and systems. These processes must be approved by the PKI Policy Management Authority (section 1.3.6).

The enrolment process for a Root CA's component certificate request

The processes and procedures used to enrol the PKI component services (e.g. CAs, OCSP responders, etc.) and to enrol the trusted persons/roles operating them are further described in internal confidential documentation.

4.2 Certificate application processing

4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions

ZETESCONFIDENS, acting as Certification Service Provider, is the owner and custodian of the keys and certificates of the CA hierarchy under the ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA.

All certificate requests for CAs and for PKI components are created by and processed by personnel of ZETESCONFIDENS on systems that are internal to the ZETESCONFIDENS PKI infrastructure.

The PKI PMA defines and assigns the trusted roles concerning the management of the CA keys and certificates, to trusted employees, as defined in internal confidential documents such as the custodian list and the CA Key Ceremony documentation. The trusted employees have been vetted and have appropriate security clearance for their respective duties. For the root CA these trusted employees are part of the quorum in charge of the Root CA key self-certification ceremony.

Only a selected group of authorized trusted employees, entitled by the PMA, are in charge generating keys and issuing a certificate request for a root CA PKI components or for a subordinate CA.

Only a selected group of authorized trusted employees, entitled by the PMA, are in charge of processing a certificate request for a root CA PKI components or for a subordinate CA.

Such requests are validated by the appropriate CA trusted roles that are involved in the process.

4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications

Root CA

The authorisation to issue a self-signed certificate comes from the PMA only.

The technical validation of the request is performed by the PKI administrator during Root CA key self-certification ceremony in presence of the quorum.

Subordinate CAs

Such as described in internal document, the Root CA RA is responsible to approve or reject an issuing CA certificate application.

The technical validation of the request is performed by the PKI administrator during a Key Ceremony in presence of the Root CA quorum.

ZETESCONFIDENS as CSP is responsible for the validation and vetting of certificate requests for CAs and internal Root CA PKI components.

The information to validate the certificate before it will be installed on the PKI component for which the certificate is intended, is recorded.

4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications

Not applicable.

4.3 Certificate issuance

4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance

All certificate requests for CAs and for PKI components are vetted and validated by personnel of ZETESCONFIDENS on systems that are internal to the ZETESCONFIDENS PKI infrastructure. Import of certificate requests and export of certificates and certificate status information is done within a closed loop circuit and by Zetes TSP trusted employees.

4.3.2 Notification of issuance of certificate

Notification of issuance of a certificate by the Zetes TSP Root CA for an internal PKI component is implicit and is specified in the internal documentation pertaining to the specific procedure or ceremony.

4.4 Certificate acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

Before the certificate is installed on the PKI component for which it is intended, the CA operators validate the certificate and compare the certificate's content and validation information with the reference information that is recorded when the certificates were issued on the Root CA.

The certificate is considered accepted upon completion of the installation and/or activation procedure on the PKI component for which the certificate is intended.

The certificate will be rejected when one or more of the following objections apply:

- the information in the certificate is incorrect,
- the information in the certificate became invalid since the date of registration,
- the information in the certificate became invalid since the date of issuance,
- the procedure was not respected.

4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA

See section 2 for information on the publication of the certificate.

4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

Notification of issuance of a certificate by the Zetes TSP Root CA for an internal PKI component is implicit and is specified in the internal documentation pertaining to the specific procedure or ceremony.

4.5 Key pair and certificate usage

4.5.1 Subscriber and Subject private key and certificate usage

Zetes TSP is the issuer and is the user of the certificates issued by the Zetes TSP Root CA.

The ZETESCONFIDENS is responsible for

- providing a secure Cryptographic Module to host and protect the private key,
- initializing the secure Cryptographic Module and its initial associated Activation Data
- using the keys only for the intended use as defined in the Certification Practice Statements and Certificate Policies for the subordinate CA hierarchy and as encoded in the certificates
- using tools that can correctly interpret the key usage as encoded in the certificate and that respect the key usage conditions
- correct usage of the Cryptographic Module

The use of a Root or a subordinate CA's private key and its associated certificate is strictly limited to the usage defined in chapters 1.4.1 and 1.4.2.

4.5.2 Relying Party public key and certificate usage

Responsibilities of relying parties, which are related to the use of public keys and certificates issued by the Zetes PKI hierarchy are specified in the related CPs.

4.6 Certificate renewal

Not applicable.

4.7 Certificate re-key

Not applicable.

4.8 Certificate modification

Not applicable.

4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension

Certificates issued by the Zetes TSP Root CA are never suspended but can be revoked. Certificate revocation is irreversible.

4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

ZETESCONFIDENS as a certification service provider (CSP), under prior or explicit approval of the PMA, must revoke a certificate issued by the Zetes TSP Root CA for security reasons or in an emergency if:

- the PMA has reason to believe or suspect that the CA's private key has been compromised;
- the PMA has reason to believe or suspect that the private key's activation data has been compromised,
- if the certified data is invalid or no longer valid.

ZETESCONFIDENS as a certification service provider (CSP), under prior or explicit approval of the PMA, may revoke a certificate issued by the Zetes TSP Root CA in a non-urgent circumstance:

- for prevention of risk, if the PMA has reason to believe or suspect that the CA's private key might be compromised in the middle term; this includes cryptography obsolescence in particular with regard to ENISA's prescriptions, new vulnerabilities in cryptography, etc.,
- if the CA or the certificate status service is decommissioned,
- if the key is renewed,
- if the CA or the certificate status service is decommissioned.

4.9.2 Parties that can request revocation

A Revocation Request for a CA certificate can only originate from the PMA. A Revocation Request for a PKI component certificate can originate from the PMA or can be requested by the Zetes TSP CA operational team, under the authority of the PMA and through the operational procedures for the PKI component in question. Under special circumstances, (see section 4.9.1) the PMA will convene without delay to decide on the matter.

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

See section 4.9.2.

4.9.4 Revocation request grace period

Zetes TSP operators are instructed to notify the PMA immediately upon discovering a reason for revocation of a certificate.

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

Under normal operational conditions an OCSP key and certificate is replaced before it is revoked, to guarantee continuity of the OCSP service towards the Relying Parties.

In case of a key compromise, ZETESCONFIDENS undertakes best effort to revoke the certificate without delay within 24 hours. The process time for revocation of a CA certificate or a PKI component certificate for any other reason will be determined on a case by case basis.

4.9.6 Revocation checking obligations for Relying Parties

Relying parties must use at least one of the services for checking certificate status information that are made available by ZETESCONFIDENS. If the preferred service is unavailable, then the Relying Party is responsible for exhausting all other services. The Relying Party is responsible for making the final decision whether or not to trust the certificate, regardless of the availability of the certificate status information services.

See section 2.2 and section 4.5.2.

4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)

The ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA issues CRLs at pre-defined intervals or ad hoc when needed. The renewal period is set to 12 months (1 year). The CRL is signed and time-marked by the Root CA. CRLs are archived for future reference.

4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)

ZETESCONFIDENS will make best effort to update the certificate status information to Relying Parties within 3 hours from the actual revocation.

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

ZETESCONFIDENS maintains an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service:

<http://ocsp.tsp.zetes.com>

4.9.10 Requirements on Relying Parties to perform on-line revocation checking

ZETESCONFIDENS maintains an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service free of charge for use by Subjects and free of charge for normal use by Relying Parties. The free OCSP service is accessible without client authentication and accepts unsigned requests.

See section 2.4 for information on Access Control and Restrictions regarding the use of the OCSP service.

4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available

Revocation of CA certificates or certificates for PKI components which are of immediate relevance for Relying Parties will be advertised during an appropriate period on the appropriate ZETESCONFIDENS repository pages:

<https://repository.tsp.zetes.com>

<http://crt.tsp.zetes.com>

<http://crl.tsp.zetes.com>

4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise

No stipulations.

4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension

Not applicable.

4.9.14 Who can request suspension

Not applicable.

4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request

Not applicable.

4.9.16 Limits on suspension period

Not applicable.

4.10 Certificate status services

4.10.1 Operational characteristics

ZETESCONFIDENS provides two services for checking the status of the certificates issued by the ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA:

- Certificate Revocation Lists
- Online Certificate Status Protocol service, open for unsigned requests

4.10.2 Service availability

OCSP service availability is designed to exceed 99.0% of business hours - defined as 24 hours per day, seven days per week, excluding planned maintenance periods.

Planned maintenance periods will be announced on <http://tsp.zetes.com> at least 24 hours in advance.

In case of unavailability due to an act of God, failure of infrastructure outside the control of ZETESCONFIDENS or any other reason, Zetes SA shall make best endeavours to reinstate availability of the service within 5 working days.

4.10.3 Optional features

No stipulations.

4.11 End of subscription

Within the context of the Zetes TSP Root CA, the Subscriber is ZETESCONFIDENS itself and the Subject is a subordinate CA or a PKI component of ZETESCONFIDENS. The end of a subscription, or the termination of a Subject, is the result of the internal decision to decommission the subordinate CA or PKI component.

Upon termination of the subscription, the certificates issued on behalf of the Subscriber will be revoked.

With regards to ZETESCONFIDENS's obligations towards the Subscriber, Subjects and Relying Parties of a decommissioned subordinate CA, ZETESCONFIDENS will continue to provide certificate status information for as long as contractually and legally required.

4.12 Key escrow and recovery

4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practice

Not applicable.

4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices

Not applicable.

5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

5.1 Physical controls

ZETESCONFIDENS has established physical security measures and environmental controls commensurate with the value and critical nature of the assets they apply to. Physical and environmental security is aimed to prevent, deter, detect and delay unauthorized access, loss, theft, damage, compromise, interferences and interruption to business activities.

5.1.1 Site location and construction

ZETESCONFIDENS facilities are organized, partitioned and segregated into distinct areas with specific physical security measures according to the type and sensitivity of assets and the operations conducted.

Physical security measures regarding the facilities include but are not limited to reinforced material and construction technics, locked rooms and vaults.

5.1.2 Physical access

The sites hosting the CA implement proper security controls, including access control, intrusion detection and CCTV. Access to the sites is limited to authorized personnel.

The CA's secure premises within these sites are located in an area appropriate for high-security operations. These premises feature numbered zones and locked rooms, cages, safes, and cabinets.

Physical access is restricted by implementing mechanisms to control access from one area of the facility to another or access into high-security zones such as locating CA operations in a secure computer room physically monitored and supported by security alarms and requiring movement from zone to zone to be accomplished using a token and access control lists.

5.1.3 Power and air conditioning

Power and air conditioning operate with a high degree of redundancy.

5.1.4 Water exposures

Premises are protected from any water damages.

5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

Prevention and protection as well as measures against fire exposures are implemented.

5.1.6 Media storage

Media are stored securely. Backup media are also stored in a separate location that is physically secure and protected from fire and water damages.

5.1.7 Waste disposal

To prevent unwanted disclosure of sensitive data, waste is disposed of in a secure manner.

5.1.8 Off-site backup

ZETESCONFIDENS has a backup and disaster recovery site located in separate premise with similar protection measures. In case of adverse situation as a natural disaster, fire or act of terrorism, ZETESCONFIDENS implements the necessary measure to recover its services according the legal and contractual requirements.

5.2 Procedural controls

5.2.1 Trusted roles

ZETESCONFIDENS follows personnel and management practices that provide reasonable assurance of the trustworthiness and competence of the members of the staff and of the satisfactory performance of their duties in the fields of electronic signature-related technologies.

All members of the staff operating the key management operations, administrators, security officers, and system auditors or any other operations that materially affect such operations are considered as serving in a trusted position.

Trusted roles within ZETESCONFIDENS are activities conducted to operate, maintain, monitor, review and communicate about TSP activities. Trusted roles are allocated to duly identified persons by the PMA.

Trusted roles are listed and defined within ZETESCONFIDENS competences management system and may include:

- Plant Manager
- PKI Manager
- Security Officer
- IT Manager
- Compliance Officer
- PKI Solution & Implementation Officer
- PKI administrator
- PKI operator
- PKI System administrator
- IT System Administrator
- System auditor
- Registration officer (not applicable for the Root CA activities)
- Revocation officer (not applicable for the Root CA activities)
- Key custodians

Zetes conducts an initial investigation of all members of staff who are candidates to serve in trusted roles to make due diligence attempt to determine their trustworthiness and competence.

5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

Where dual or multiple control is required, at least two trusted roles need to bring their respective and split knowledge in order to be able to proceed with the ongoing operation.

Circumstances requiring dual or multiple control are detailed in the PKI system and documented in the (root) CA key ceremonies reports and related records.

5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role

Each member of ZETESCONFIDENS acting in a trusted role is identified and authenticated to access the infrastructure to conduct his role by means of at least 2 factors authentication credentials or under dual control.

5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties

All actions with respect to the Root CA can be attributed to the components of the Root CA and the member of the Root CA staff that has performed the action.

Zetes ensures separation among the following discrete work groups documented in internal documents:

- PKI administration personnel
- System and network administration personnel
- Security personnel,
- Audit personnel.

5.3 Personnel controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

Zetes implements practices that provides reasonable assurance regarding trustworthiness and competence of the member of its staff. Learning and training certificates, professional experience, feedback from previous employers, trusted employee's recommendations, certificates delivered by the authority are some common practices used in this perspective.

5.3.2 Background check procedures

Zetes with regards to the CA activities makes the relevant checks on prospective employees by means of status reports issued by a competent authority or third-party statements.

5.3.3 Training requirements

Zetes with regards to the CA activities makes available relevant technical training for their personnel to perform their CA functions.

5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements

Periodic training updates will be carried out to establish continuity and updates in the knowledge of the personnel and procedures.

5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence

Zetes does not impose job rotation as a principle. Changes in roles are managed through training and competences management with respect of segregation of roles where applicable.

5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions

Zetes with regards to the CA activities sanctions personnel for unauthorized actions or violation of security procedures. Sanctions may include – but are not limited to – disciplinary action, revocation of privileges, dismissal, civil or criminal proceedings.

The severity of a particular violation is evaluated by the PMA. The PMA ensure that the sanction taken is both appropriate and proportional to the violation.

5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements

Independent CA component services subcontractors and their personnel are subject to the same background checks as the CA personnel with regards to the CA activities. The background checks include:

- Criminal convictions for serious crimes.
- Misrepresentations by the candidate.
- Appropriateness of references.
- Any clearances as deemed appropriate.
- Privacy protection.
- Confidentiality conditions.

5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel

Zetes with regards to the CA activities makes available documentation to personnel, during initial training, retraining, or otherwise.

5.4 Audit logging procedures

5.4.1 Types of events recorded

For all events related to the Root CA key operations, records will be kept that include all information related to that event that can be useful for auditing purposes.

Extensive security logging and monitoring is performed at various levels including (non-exhaustive):

- the physical level (including equipment cabinet access)
- the network level (if applicable)
- the operating system level
- the application level

The PKI software and associated routines record events that include but are not limited to:

- Issuance of a certificate: request, approval or rejection (with reason) of request, registration information, identification of the members of the PMA approving, identification of the trusted roles processing the request, certificate generation/activation, ...
- Revocation of a certificate: revocation request, approval or rejection (with reason) of request, identification of the members of the PMA approving, identification of the trusted roles processing the request, identification of the requestor, ...
- Publishing of a CRL
- Request to and answers from the OCSP services (responders)

The audit logs records contain:

- The identification of the operation.
- The date and time of the operation.
- The identification of the certificate, involved in the operation.
- The identity of the transaction requestor (e.g. (more than one) members of the PMA).

In addition, audit logs of relevant operational events in the infrastructure are maintained, including, but not limited to:

- Log in and log out of PKI components administrative interfaces.
- Start and stop of servers.
- Outages and major problems.
- Physical access of personnel and other persons to sensitive parts of the PKI site.
- Backup and restore.
- Report of disaster recovery tests.
- Audit inspections.
- Upgrades and changes to systems, software and infrastructure.
- Security intrusions and attempts at intrusion.

Auditing events are not given log notice.

All events occurring prior and during a Root CA ceremony are logged in a log sheet. This cover:

- Ceremony authorisation by the PMA
- Root CA key (initial) key generation and self-certification
- Issuance of CRL
- Issuance of a subordinate CA certificate
- Revocation of a subordinate CA certificate
- Root CA key recovery
- ...

5.4.2 Frequency of processing log

The PKI operations staffs regularly monitor security related events. Information about critical events is forwarded to the appropriate department for immediate attention. Reports that are generated from the audit logs are reviewed by internal auditors.

5.4.3 Retention period for audit log

System logs are retained for 18 months. For audit logs for the CA and PKI components, see section 5.5.2.

5.4.4 Protection of audit log

The audit logs of the CA application software and PKI components application software are digitally signed and time stamped. The signature key is protected by an HSM. Consolidated logs are stored on secure backup media and stored in a safe storage location.

5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures

Automated audit data is generated and recorded at the application, network and operating system level. Manually generated audit data is recorded by PKI CA Officers. For key ceremonies, a relevant extract of the audit log is made stored separately.

5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)

The PKI audit collection system is internal.

5.4.7 Notification to event-causing Subject

There are no requirement for ZETESCONFIDENS to notify the Subject who caused an audit event.

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments

The entire infrastructure is subject of a vulnerability assessment at least once a year and whenever a critical part of the infrastructure is affected. The assessment covers the ICT infrastructure, the special cryptographic equipment, the physical environment, data storage, software, personnel, processes and procedures and communication.

Vulnerability assessment of the audit log is part of the ZETESCONFIDENS risk assessment and risk management program documented internally.

5.5 Records archival

5.5.1 Types of records archived

See section 5.4.1 and 5.5.2.

5.5.2 Retention period for archive

The archive retention periods for the various types of records are:

- issued certificates for a period of 30 years after expiration of a certificate,
- Audit trails on the issuance of certificates for a period of at least 30 years after expiration of a certificate,
- copies of identification documents are retained for at least 30 years after expiration of the certificate,
- Audit trail of the revocation of a certificate for a period of at least 30 years after revocation of a certificate,
- CRLs for at least 30 years after creation,
- Documentation supporting the issuance and use of the certificate is kept for a period of at least 30 years after the expiration of the last certificate supported by the documentation.

5.5.3 Protection of archives

The archives are protected against manipulation or wilful destruction. As far as possible archive will be retained and protected in electronic form.

Paper-based records are archived and under control of the respective roles that process them. Paper-based archive may be stored on multiple locations. The information will be securely stored to provide reasonable assurance regarding secrecy, integrity and availability.

5.5.4 Archive backup procedures

Backup copies of the relevant electronic system logs and electronic audit logs are stored in multiple locations.

5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records

The audit logs created by the CA and OCSP service are signed and time stamped, the signature key is protected by an HSM and the time source is the same as for the CA or OCSP service.

5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)

The archive collection system for the CA and PKI components operated by ZETESCONFIDENS is internal infrastructure of ZETESCONFIDENS.

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

The contents of the archive are not accessible except for authorized personnel of ZETESCONFIDENS and with exception of obligations by law or by court order.

Access to archive by authorized personnel must be motivated (e.g. in case of incident investigation, to test the "retrieval" procedure, etc.).

Disclosure of information from the archive upon request by an implicated party is at the discretion of ZETESCONFIDENS and requires approval by the PMA. ZETESCONFIDENS reserves the right to charge a compensation to cover the expenses of the retrieval of the information from the archives.

5.6 Key changeover

Not applicable, as CA certificates will be issued with a validity time within the validity time of the Root CA certificates.

5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures

Zetes TSP defined an incident management procedure including incident reporting and handling procedure.

These procedures are established to ensure a quick, effective and orderly response to (information) security incidents providing knowledge to reduce the likelihood and impact of recurring incident. Incident records and gained knowledge are reviewed during the risk assessment exercise and participate from the risk management procedure.

The specific cases of key compromises are dealt in section 5.7.3.

5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted

Zetes TSP establishes the necessary measures to ensure full and highly automated recovery of CA services in case of a disaster, corrupted servers, software or data.

Computing resources, software and data are replicated in a second location. Backup copies of software and data are kept on regular base and available on both sites according the ZETESCONFIDENS backup procedure.

Distance between both locations supporting ZETESCONFIDENS activities is sufficient to support a natural local disaster. Sufficient fast and secure communication infrastructure and services between the two sites ensures data integrity and effective recovery point.

Disaster recovery infrastructure and procedures are be fully tested at least once a year and the report is reviewed by the PMA.

5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures

In case of a CA compromise, ZETESCONFIDENS will

- decommission the compromised key
- Notify impacted PKI participants
- revoke the certificates impacted by the compromised CA
- assess the relevance to revoke all certificates (this depends amongst other on the time of compromise)

By decision of the PMA and providing that the cause of compromise has been discarded, ZETESCONFIDENS will generate a new CA key and destroyed certificates can be re-issued.

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster

Zetes TSP establishes the necessary measures to full and automatic recovery of the on-line services in case of a disaster, corrupted servers, software or data.

Recovery of the Root CA off-line services is ensured by the activation of the Root CA backup at the secondary site. As principle for the root CA key ceremony, all needed resources and secrets to pursuit the ZETESCONFIDENS activities will still be available in case one site should completely and definitely be destroyed.

Depending on the cause of the disaster and their effects, the PMA will assess the measures to be taken regarding

- the protection of sensitive resources and information on the disabled site
- the need to revoke the CA's impacted by the disaster (as the protection of disabled site cannot be ensured)
- the setup of a third site

A Business Continuity Plan has been implemented to ensure business continuity following a natural or other disaster and is available as a separate internal document.

5.8 CA or RA termination

Terminating a certification service and as a result terminating, when applicable, the CA(s) and other PKI component services is an event as important as their initiation. Both require planning physical, logical, operational, procedural and human aspects. Security of information and reputation is at risk. Furthermore, legal requirements apply.

For clarification, the cessation of the issuance of new certificates by the ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA while all other component services are kept under full normal operations, including the provision of certificate validity status information services (e.g. CRLs, OCSP services), is not in scope. Also, the controlled transfer of services and components from ZETESCONFIDENS to another organization or transfer from an old CA to a new CA are not in scope.

This section describes the minimum procedures to be completed in a situation where all services provided by ZETESCONFIDENS associated with qualified certificates are terminated:

In the context of a scheduled termination:

- Cessation of the issuance of any new certificate
- Termination notification to the Belgian Supervisory Body and Relying Parties within 3 months and no later than 2 months before the effective termination
- Dissemination of relevant information
- Preservation and transfer of auditing and archival records to the arranged custodian
- Revocation of unexpired and unrevoked Subjects' Qualified Certificates
- Creation of a last CRL
- When applicable, decommissioning of the CA keys

In the context of an unscheduled termination:

As far as it is possible, the plan for expected termination as described in section above will be followed with the following potential significant differences:

- Shorter or even no delay for the notification of the interested parties
- Shorter or no delay for the revocation of Certificates

6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

Private keys for the ZETESCONFIDENS PKI infrastructure are protected by means of Hardware Security Modules that have the relevant security certification labels such as FIPS 140-2 level 3 and/or Common Criteria EAL4+ or higher.

Physical access to the HSM is limited to authorised personnel only. The HSM equipment is installed in a secure environment.

Operational use of the HSM equipment is controlled by a combination of activation assets (e.g. smartcards) and activation data (e.g. PIN codes, passphrases, etc.). Activation assets and activation data are assigned to multiple custodians and are stored in a secure location, separate from the HSM equipment. Activation, backup and restore operations always requires involvement of multiple custodians. The separation of activation assets/data is organized such that no single custodian can exercise control over the protected key material.

6.1 Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1 Key pair generation

Key pair generation for CAs

The key pairs for the Zetes TSP Root CA are generated on-board an HSM, under the authority of and with explicit consent of the PMA, under supervision of a Security Officer, under at least dual control and as part of a formal key ceremony in the presence of witnesses.

Key pair generation for the OCSP service

The key pairs for the OCSP service components are generated on-board an HSM, under the authority of and with explicit consent of the PMA, under supervision of a Security Officer, under dual control and as part of a formal key ceremony in the presence of witnesses.

Key pair generation for the other PKI components

The key pairs for other PKI components are generated on-board an HSM, under the authority of and with explicit consent of the PMA, under supervision of a Security Officer and under dual control.

Key pair generation for operators

The key pairs for operators are generated on-board an SSCD Type 3 Secure Subject Device, under the authority of and with explicit consent of the PMA, under supervision of a Security Officer and under dual control.

The SSCD for PKI operators are stored in a secure location, separate from the HSM equipment. The operators are handed the SSCD as and when needed to perform an authorized task.

6.1.2 Private key delivery to Subscriber or Subject

Not applicable.

6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer

The ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA is an offline CA. Certificate requests (that include the public key of the requester) are transferred by means of a secure storage medium. The storage medium's technical characteristic protects the

data content against unauthorized manipulation. The transfer is done in a single key ceremony, in the presence of witnesses, and with a direct transfer of the public key immediately following the generation of the key pair.

This applies for public keys for subordinate CAs (such as the ZETESCONFIDENS Qualified CA) and for public keys for OCSP services that act on behalf of the ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA.

The procedures, the ceremony, the tools used and the environment in which the key pair is generated and the public key extracted, ensure that the requester is in possession of the private key for which the certificate is requested.

6.1.4 CA public key delivery to Relying Parties

ZETESCONFIDENS CA certificates are published on a secure web site:

<https://repository.tsp.zetes.com>

Relying Parties can authenticate the web site by means of the SSL/TLS server authentication certificate which is issued by a public CA that is external to the ZETESCONFIDENS CA hierarchy.

The authentic “thumbprint” of the ZETESCONFIDENS CA certificates is published in a document in PDF/A format.

Relying parties may contact ZETESCONFIDENS via e-mail at info@tsp.zetes.com to receive confirmation of the authentic “thumbprint” of the CA certificates by means of an out-of-band channel such as a telephone call, e-mail or letter.

6.1.5 Key sizes

The ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA uses the following algorithms and key sizes:

Root CA	RSA4096	generated and used on HSM
OCSP	RSA2048	generated and used on HSM (of the OCSP infrastructure)
Internally signed audit logs	RSA2048	generated and used on HSM
SSCD Type 3 *	RSA2048	generated and used on SSCD Type 3

** used as Secure Subject Device for authentication of PKI operators*

All certificates are signed using SHA256withRSA.

ZETESCONFIDENS reserves the right to introduce other algorithms and protocols than SHA256withRSA or longer key lengths in the future. This may include Elliptic Curve algorithms instead of RSA and other hash algorithms.

ZETESCONFIDENS is not in any way held to continue using the current algorithms, protocols or key lengths for any purpose, should ZETESCONFIDENS decide that the current algorithms, protocols or key lengths provide insufficient assurance and security for the intended purpose and the intended use period.

6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking

Public key parameters for the Zetes TSP Root CA are generated and checked in accordance with the standard that defines the cryptographic algorithm in which the parameters are to be used. Public key parameters shall be generated and tested in accordance with the FIPS 186-3 standard which ensure the quality of the key material.

The following parameters are used:

- the HSM operates in FIPS140-2 level 3 mode
- key generation relies on the HSM’s deterministic (pseudo) random number generator

- key generation is compliant with FIPS 186-4

6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

ZETESCONFIDENS ensures that the key usage properties encoded in the certificates correspond with the intended use of the certificates as described in this Certification Practice Statement:

Key usage for CA certificates:

KeyCert signing

CRL signing

Key usage for OCSP certificates:

digitalSignature - OCSP signing

An additional restriction on key usage applies to all the keys that are used for internal purposes by PKI operators and systems. These keys may only be used within the context and restrictions of the operator's role or system's role within the Zetes TSP PKI environment.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls

To protect the private keys used by the CA and the OCSP service, the ZETESCONFIDENS Qualified CA uses state of the art cryptographic modules. In this document, these will be referred to as HSM (for Hardware Security Module).

The HSM of the Zetes TSP Root CA has the following security certifications:

- NIST FIPS 140-2 level 3
- Common Criteria certification evaluation assurance level EAL4+

6.2.2 Private key multi-person control

The activation and/or use of the private keys in the HSM infrastructure that hold the private keys for the Zetes TSP Root CA is protected by access control and activation mechanisms that require multiple custodians to be involved in the process. The activation assets or activation data needed for the activation and/or use of the HSMs is under control of yet more trusted roles and are not directly accessible to the custodians. Custodians require prior approval by the authorized Security Officer to be allowed access to the activation assets or activation data under their care.

6.2.3 Private key escrow

Private keys are never put in escrow.

6.2.4 Private key backup

Private keys on an HSM for the CA or OCSP infrastructure are generated on-board the HSM and are backed up, encrypted by means of a backup encryption key.

The backups are exclusively used for:

- restore for recovery in case of failure of the infrastructure
- restore in case of replacement of an existing HSM

The backup encryption key is itself generated inside the HSM during the installation and initialization of HSM and is split into key shares which are stored on a set of HSM backup cards.

Backup and restore or transfer of private keys requires a quorum of n -of- m HSM backup cards. Each card has an activation code which is independent from the other cards.

Private keys and other security critical data is always encrypted (backup operation) or decrypted (restore operation) inside the HSM itself. The encryption key is split over a set of m HSM cards. A restore operation requires a pre-defined quorum of n -of- m HSM backup cards.

The backup, the activation assets and the activation data are assigned to multiple custodians and are stored in separate locations.

6.2.5 Private key archival

Private keys are not archived as such but are backed up and stored for other reasons. See section 6.2.4.

6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

Private keys on an HSM for the CA or OCSP infrastructure are generated on-board the HSM and can be transferred to another HSM. Transfer of private keys to another HSM requires multi-person control in the form of a quorum of n -of- m HSM cards. Transfer of private keys into another HSM requires approval of the PMA. See section 6.2.4 for information on the segregation of cards and codes.

6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module

All private keys inside the HSM are loaded into and decrypted inside the HSM, and can only be used for operational purposes when loaded in the HSM. Multi-personnel control by means of n -of- m HSM cards is required to load and activate the keys into the HSM. The sensory controller of the HSM can, in a case of an alarm, delete or render useless the key material in the HSM.

6.2.8 Method of activating private key

Private keys for the Root CA

Activation of the private keys in the ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA requires multiple authorized administrators and operators for activating the HSM by means of n -of- m HSM cards and for accessing the control interface of the CA application.

Private keys on the dedicated HSM for the Root CA are grouped per CA entity (i.e. per logical CA, not physical CA). Access to the control interface for activating or deactivating a group is restricted by a dual control mechanism.

Private keys for OCSP service

The HSM for the OCSP service is not used for CA functions. Private keys on the dedicated HSM for the OCSP service are automatically activated upon power on without requiring further intervention. Deactivation of the private key requires at least two authorized administrators and operators.

6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key

Private keys on the dedicated HSM for the Root CA are grouped per CA entity (i.e. per logical CA, not physical CA). Access to the control interface for activating or deactivating a group is restricted by a dual control mechanism.

6.2.10 Method of destroying private key

Destruction of a private key requires authorization of the PMA. When a key is decommissioned, the private key is deleted from all HSM equipment by means of the HSM secure key destruction mechanism and appropriate measures are taken to prevent that a backup of the can be restored.

6.2.11 Capabilities and Rating of the Cryptographic Module

The HSM complies with the technical requirement CEN EN 319 411 part 1 under the European Regulation on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market (referred to as the eIDAS - electronic Identification and Authentication Services) was published as Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of 28 August 2014. The HSM is certified FIPS 140-2 level 3 and CC EAL4+ (AVA_VAN.5) in compliance with the eIDAS Transitional Measures (Article 51).

6.3 Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1 Public key archival

ZETESCONFIDENS maintains an internal archive of all CA public keys and all public keys certified by the ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA in the form of the certificates that contain the public key.

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

The ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA will not issue certificates that exceed the certificate expiration date of the CA certificate.

The key usage period of a CA key is aligned with the expiration date / lifetime of the certificates issued with that key.

6.4 Activation data

All activation data such as PIN codes, passwords and passphrases and activation assets such as smartcards are securely stored in multiple locations in locked compartments in safes in a secure vault.

Activation data and the associated activation assets are segregated, i.e. are assigned to different custodians, and are stored in separate storage compartments for each custodian.

Where relevant, activation data such as passwords and passphrases are split in parts and each part is assigned to a different custodian.

Strict rules for the length, syntax, structure and content of the activation data ensure that the activation data for critical assets is non-trivial and contains sufficient variation.

6.5 Computer security controls

ZETESCONFIDENS ensures that computer security controls are implemented according the technical standard ETSI EN 319411-2. ZETES operates its sites involved with TSP activities according ISO 27001 requirements. The Implemented Information Security Management System includes several controls related to computer security and a.o.:

- Exclusively offline usage, the Zetes TSP Root CA is not connected to any network
- Exclusively switched on, on a need to use basis, the Zetes TSP Root CA is switched off and stored in a safe, the equipment is only taken out of the safe and switched on when necessary.
- Control of sensitive data stored on “demobilized” or reusable storage device
- Use of multifactor authentication for accounts capable to issue certificates
- Access control, intrusion detection system and CCTV monitoring to detect, record and react upon unauthorized access to its resources

6.6 Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1 System development controls

Implemented in compliance with ETSI EN 319 411.

6.6.2 Security management controls

Implemented in compliance with ETSI EN 319 411.

6.6.3 Life cycle security controls

Implemented in compliance with ETSI EN 319 411.

6.7 Network security controls

Not applicable. The Zetes TSP Root CA is not connected to any network.

6.8 Time-stamping

Not applicable.

7 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES

7.1 Certificate profile

Overview of this root CA and the CA hierarchy:

ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001

```

| certificate serial number = 02 54 1A A9 50 D7 CE 1F
| certificate thumbprint = 37 53 D2 95 FC 6D 8B C3 9B 37 56 50 BF FC 82 1A ED 50 4E 1A
| CPS OID = 1.3.6.1.4.1.47718.2.1.1.1
| CP OID = 1.3.6.1.4.1.47718.2.1.2.1
|
| ---- Zetes TSP Qualified CA 001
| certificate serial number = 38 20 EE 9C 74 EC D1 47
| certificate thumbprint = 16 98 DC 47 F4 F5 FF 95 6C 56 03 24 E1 96 5A A7 ED 38 E2 9D
|
| ---- ZETES TSP CA FOR TSA 001
| certificate serial number = 2E 31 E4 74 F6 05 91 BA
| certificate thumbprint = 37 02 B9 F1 77 AF AA 8D 07 7C 06 C3 E4 94 82 C5 A1 75 D3 2C
|
| ---- ZetesConfidens - Signature Creation Service - issuing CA 001
| certificate serial number = 2F F6 42 AD 1A EA 7E 0B
| certificate thumbprint = 36 9B 53 56 13 C8 90 27 27 50 7B 92 6D 3F 57 F5 42 31 28 E0

```

Note: the Certificate profiles for the subordinate CAs are provided in the CPS/CP document of the respective CAs.

Certificate profile for the ZETES TSP Root CA:

Table 1 ZETES TSP ROOT CA - Certificate Profile for ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001 self-signed certificate

certificate profile			
ZETES TSP ROOT CA - self-signed root certificate			
ATTRIBUTES			
Version		-	0x02 (= X.509 certificate version 3)
Serial Number		-	02 54 1A A9 50 D7 CE 1F 64-bit random number (compliant with CA/B Forum requirements), validated to ensure uniqueness of the certificate serial number, compliant with RFC 5280 and X.690
Signaturealgorithm	algorithm	-	sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value		-	the signature created by the CA
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	algorithm	-	RSA4096
	subjectPublicKey	-	value of the public key
Validity	notBefore	-	20/05/2016 (dd/mm/yyyy)
	notAfter	-	20/05/2036 (dd/mm/yyyy)
Issuer	serialNumber	-	001 (the 3-digit serial number of the CA)
	commonName	-	ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001
	organizationName	-	ZETES SA (VATBE-0408425626)
	countryName	-	BE
Subject	serialNumber	-	001
	commonName	-	ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001
	organizationName	-	ZETES SA (VATBE-0408425626)
	countryName	-	BE
EXTENSIONS -- Authority Properties			
authorityKeyIdentifier	keyIdentifier	-	38 BC 5C 30 54 DC E2 BB 20 EF EE 6F 41 A0 31 6E 5C FD 8B 75
EXTENSIONS -- Subject Properties			
subjectKeyIdentifier	keyIdentifier	-	38 BC 5C 30 54 DC E2 BB 20 EF EE 6F 41 A0 31 6E 5C FD 8B 75

EXTENSIONS -- Policy Properties			
keyUsage	KeyCertSign	c	true
	CRLSign	c	true
certificatePolicies	policyIdentifier	-	OID=2.5.29.32.0 [AnyPolicy]
	policyQualifierID	-	Id-qt-1 (CPS)
	qualifier	-	https://repository.tsp.zetes.com
basicConstraints	subjectType	c	CA path length constraint = none

7.2 CRL profile

Generic CRL profile for consolidated CRL:

Table 2 ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001 - CRL profile

CRL profile			
ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001 - CRL			
ATTRIBUTES			
Version		-	2
SignatureAlgorithm	algorithm	-	sha256WithRSAEncryption
		-	<the signature created by ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001 >
Issuer	serialNumber	-	001
	commonName	-	ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001
	organizationName	-	ZETES SA (VATBE-0408425626)
	countryName	-	BE
ThisUpdate		-	<time of issue >
NextUpdate		-	<time of issue + 1 year>
Revoked Certificates	userCertificate	-	<certificate serial number>
	revocationDate	-	<revocation time>
	crEntryExtension CRLReason	-	<reason for revocation> - included for every certificate -
EXTENSIONS			
Authority Key Identifier		-	38 BC 5C 30 54 DC E2 BB 20 EF EE 6F 41 A0 31 6E 5C FD 8B 75
CRL Number		-	dynamically assigned by the CA

7.3 OCSP profile

Generic certificate profile for a ZETES TSP Root CA OCSP responder certificate:

Table 3 ZETES TSP ROOT CA - Certificate Profile for OCSP responder

certificate profile			
ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001 - OCSP responder certificate			
ATTRIBUTES			
Version		-	0x02 (= X.509 certificate version 3)
Serial Number		-	< 64-bit random number (compliant with CA/B Forum requirements), validated to ensure uniqueness of the certificate serial number, compliant with RFC 5280 and X.690 >
SignatureAlgorithm	algorithm	-	sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value		-	< the signature created by ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001 >
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	algorithm	-	RSA2048
	subjectPublicKey	-	< value of the public key >
Validity	notBefore	-	< certificate validity start date >
	notAfter	-	< certificate validity start date + 1 year >
Issuer	serialNumber	-	001 (<i>the 3-digit serial number of the CA</i>)
	commonName	-	ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001
	organizationName	-	ZETES SA (VATBE-0408425626)
	countryName	-	BE
Subject	commonName	-	ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001 OCSP responder
	organizationName	-	ZETES SA (VATBE-0408425626)
	countryName	-	BE
EXTENSIONS -- Authority Properties			
authorityKeyIdentifier	keyIdentifier	-	38 BC 5C 30 54 DC E2 BB 20 EF EE 6F 41 A0 31 6E 5C FD 8B 75
EXTENSIONS -- Subject Properties			
subjectKeyIdentifier	keyIdentifier	-	< 4-bit value 0100 + least significant 60 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the value of subjectPublicKey bit string (tag, excluding the length and number of unused bit-string bits), as specified in RFC 5280 >
EXTENSIONS -- Policy Properties			
keyUsage	DigitalSignature	c	< true >
enhancedKeyUsage	OCSP Signing	c	< true >
OCSPNoCheck		-	< null >

8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

Besides the supervision by the Belgian national supervisory body's (BeSign), ZETESCONFIDENS through its PMA organizes with regards to its CA activities a compliance audit to ensure that it meets requirements, standards, procedures and service levels according to this CPS.

8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment

ZETESCONFIDENS' certificates issuance process and related services including Registration and Revocation processes will be audited at least once a year for compliance with

- the present CPS and appropriate CP's,
- the technical standards ETSI 319401 and ETSI 319411-2

The PMA reserves the right to organize further audits e.g. in the context of changes in the infrastructure, changes in the organization, security incident.

8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor

Compliance audits will be performed by a Conformity Assessment Body as defined in point 13 of article 2 of Regulation EC N°765/2008 and compliant with the CA/B Forum requirement for qualified auditors as per CA/Browser Forum BR version 1.6.7 section 8.2.

8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

To carry out the audits there will be an independent auditor appointed who will not be affiliated directly or indirectly in any way with the CSP.

8.4 Topics covered by assessment

The planned annual audit covers –but is not limited to – all aspects of the CA's operations and related services as specified in the present CPS and related CP's according to section 8.1 of the present CPS.

8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency

Detected deficiencies and non-conformities will be reported to the PMA in written. Additional oral comments and clarifications can be provided by the auditor.

The PMA will assess the severity and the extent of the detected deficiencies. In accordance with the auditor, the PMA will determine the time frame and the actions to be conducted to rectify the deficiencies.

A follow-up audit to verify the effectiveness of the actions conducted can be decided by the PMA to ensure compliance.

8.6 Communication of results

Audit report and findings are communicated by the auditor to the audited entities and to the PMA.

In some circumstances, e.g. suspicion of internal fraud, the auditor will not disclose his findings to the audited entity.

Audit report and findings will list all detected deficiencies with their level of severity but without disclosing any information that could be used to attack the system.

By default, audit reports are classified at level "CONFIDENTIAL" and distributed on a need to know basis.

9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS

The ZETESCONFIDENS Certificates Terms and Conditions constitute the main set of ZETESCONFIDENS standard terms and conditions for the provision and use of ZETESCONFIDENS CA's certificate offerings to end-entities.

The provision and use of end-entities Certificates issued by ZETESCONFIDENS subordinate CA are governed by the related Certification Practice Statement (CPS) and Terms and Conditions and are out of scope of the present document.

The sections below only provide useful information about certain terms and conditions governing the use of ZETESCONFIDENS Root CA's service.

9.1 Fees

See the applicable end-entity's Terms and Conditions.

9.2 Financial responsibility

9.2.1 Insurance coverage

The liability of ZETESCONFIDENS towards the Subscriber or a Relying Party may be limited according to the applicable CPS/CP.

Subject to any limitation of liability referred to in the applicable CPS/CP, the general rules on liability apply with regard to any damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on a certificate issued by ZETESCONFIDENS.

ZETESCONFIDENS explicitly declines all liability towards Relying Parties in all cases where Certificates are used beyond the limitation expressed in this present CPS and the relevant CP and CPS of the Certificate.

9.2.2 Other assets

ZETESCONFIDENS shall monitor on a regular basis that it maintains adequate resources to meet its obligations regarding the provision and use of its ZETESCONFIDENS offering under this Certification Practice Statement and elsewhere in its Agreements.

9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

Zetes S.A. benefits from insurance coverage covering ZETESCONFIDENS services for public, product and professional liabilities.

9.3 Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1 Scope of confidential information

Examples of confidential business information include:

- the Subscriber's confidential information supplied to ZETES at the time of its subscription. Information that is published in the Certificate is NOT confidential.
- the Subscriber's or Relying Parties' confidential information supplied to ZETES in support requests (other than any information that is published in a ZETESCONFIDENS issued Certificate)
- the private key(s) of Certificates

9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

For the avoidance of any doubt, the following information is not considered as confidential:

- the information published in a ZETESCONFIDENS issued Certificate
- the revocation records of a Certificate
- this Certification Practice Statement

9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information

ZETESCONFIDENS and Subscriber Obligations of Confidentiality are described in the applicable Certificates Terms and Conditions.

ZETESCONFIDENS will keep confidential and not disclose the confidential information to any person save as expressly permitted by law or foreseen in the Agreement.

ZETESCONFIDENS will protect the confidential information against unauthorised disclosure by using the same degree of care as it takes to preserve and safeguard its own confidential information of a similar nature, being at least a reasonable degree of care and skill in accordance with the state-of-the-art.

9.4 Privacy of personal information

The TSP operates within the boundaries of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, the Belgian Law of 30 July 2018 on Privacy Protection in relation to the Processing of Personal Data.

For end-entities certificates, see the applicable end-entity's Terms and Conditions for more information on the privacy plan.

9.4.1 Information treated as private

Refer to the intro text of Section 9.4.

9.4.2 Information not deemed private

Refer to the intro text of Section 9.4.

9.4.3 Responsibility to protect private information

Refer to the intro text of Section 9.4.

9.4.4 Notice and consent to use private information

Refer to the intro text of Section 9.4.

9.4.5 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

Refer to the intro text of Section 9.4.

9.4.6 Other information disclosure circumstances

Refer to the intro text of Section 9.4.

9.5 Intellectual property rights

Any and all intellectual property rights ("IPR") (including title, ownership rights, database rights, and any other intellectual property rights) in ZETESCONFIDENS offering, and documentation or other materials developed or

supplied in connection with that offering, including any associated processes or any derivative works, are and will remain the sole and exclusive property of Zetes or its licensors.

No rights are granted by ZETESCONFIDENS other than those expressly granted under this Certification Practice Statement or elsewhere in the applicable Subscriber Agreement.

The IPR with regards to Zetes acting as CSP, are ruled by the applicable “Certificates Terms and Conditions”.

9.6 Representations and warranties

9.6.1 CA representations and warranties

Zetes S.A. acting as CSP issues X509 v3-compatible Certificates (ISO 9594-8).

ZETESCONFIDENS issues Certificates compliant with either ETSI EN 319 411 requirements.

ZETESCONFIDENS guarantees that all the requirements set out in the applicable CP (and indicated in the Certificate in accordance with Section 7 of the CP) are complied with. It also assumes responsibility for ensuring such compliance and providing these services in accordance with the applicable CPS.

The sole guarantee provided by Zetes S.A. acting as CSP is that its procedures are implemented in accordance with the applicable CPS and the verification procedures then in effect, and that all Certificates issued with a CP Object Identifier (OID) have been issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of the applicable CP, the verification procedures, and the CPS as applicable at the time of issuance. In addition other warranties may be implied in the applicable CP definition by operation of law.

9.6.2 RA representations and warranties

See the applicable end-entity’s Terms and Conditions.

9.6.3 Subscriber and Subject representations and warranties

The Subscriber accepts the “Certificates Terms and Conditions”.

The Subscriber agrees to the CPS and to his/her relevant responsibilities, liabilities and obligations as provided in the relevant sections of the applicable CPS and CP.

9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

Examples of Relying Parties’ obligations and responsibilities include (without limitation):

- the successful performance of public key operations as a pre-condition for relying on a ZETESCONFIDENS Certificate
- the validation of a ZETESCONFIDENS Certificate by using the applicable Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
- the immediate termination of any reliance on a ZETESCONFIDENS Certificate if it has been revoked or when it has expired

9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants

No additional stipulation.

9.7 Disclaimers of warranties

Except as expressly provided elsewhere in the CPS, the applicable CP and in the applicable legislation, ZETESCONFIDENS disclaims all warranties and obligations of any type, including any warranty of merchantability, any warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and any warranty of accuracy of information provided (except that it came from an authorised source), and further disclaims any and all liability for negligence and lack of reasonable care on the part of Subscribers and Relying Parties.

ZETESCONFIDENS does not warrant any software.

9.8 Limitations of liability

Exclusion of Certain Elements of Damages

Within the limit set by Belgian Law, in no event (except for fraud or wilful misconduct) will ZETESCONFIDENS be liable for:

- Any loss of profits;
- Any loss of data;
- Any indirect, consequential or punitive damages arising from or in connection with the use, delivery, license, and performance or non-performance of certificates or digital signatures;
- Any other damages beyond proven direct damages.

9.9 Indemnities

Zetes TSP acting as CSP assumes no financial responsibility for improperly used Certificates, CRLs, etc.

9.10 Term and termination

9.10.1 Term

This CPS and any amendments hereto shall become effective after publication in the Repository and in accordance with section 9.12.2 and shall remain in effect perpetually until terminated in accordance with this Section 9.10.

9.10.2 Termination

This shall remain in force until it is amended or replaced by a new version in accordance with this Section 9.10.

9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival

The conditions and effect resulting from termination of this CPS will be communicated via the ZETESCONFIDENS web site upon termination. That communication will outline the provisions that may survive termination of this CPS and remain in force. The responsibilities for protecting business confidential and private personal information shall survive termination, and the terms and conditions for all existing Certificates shall remain valid for the remainder of the validity periods of such Certificates.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

All notices and other communications which may or are required to be given, served or sent pursuant to the CPS shall be in writing and shall be sent, except provided explicitly in the CPS, either by (i) registered mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, (ii) an internationally recognised “overnight” or express courier service, (iii) hand delivery (iv) facsimile transmission, deemed received upon actual delivery or completed facsimile, or (v) an advanced electronic signature based on a Certificate and a (secure) signature creation device ((S)SCD) and be addressed to:

ZETESCONFIDENS PMA, Zetes S.A., Rue de Strasbourg 3, 1130 Bruxelles, Belgium, Fax +32 2 728 37 51.

9.12 Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for amendment

ZETESCONFIDENS acting as CSP is responsible via its Policy Management Authority (PMA) for approval and changes of the present CPS.

The only changes that the PMA may make to these CPS specifications without notification are minor changes that do not affect the assurance level of this CPS, e.g., editorial or typographical corrections, or changes to the contact details.

Errors, updates, or suggested changes to this document shall be communicated as identified in the present CPS, section 1.5.4 . Such communication must include a description of the change, a change justification, and contact information of the person requesting the change.

The PMA shall accept, modify or reject the proposed change after completion of a review phase.

9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period

After approval a new version of the CP-CPS is created and published beside the former version on the repository website. The date of issuance and the effective date are indicated on the title page of the present CPS. The effective date will be at least 4 days later than the date of publication.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed

Not applicable.

9.13 Dispute resolution provisions

All disputes associated with the present CPS will be resolved according to the Belgian laws.

9.14 Governing law

The Belgian laws shall govern the enforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of the present CPS (without giving effect to any conflict of law provision that would cause the application of other laws).

9.15 Compliance with applicable law

The present CPS and provision of CA certification services are compliant to relevant and applicable laws of Belgium.

9.16 Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1 Entire agreement

No stipulation.

9.16.2 Assignment

No stipulation.

9.16.3 Severability

No stipulation.

9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

No stipulation.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

No stipulation.

9.17 Other provisions

Not applicable.

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